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Abstract The paper analyzes the strategic effects of decentralized user-fee and en-
forcement policies for the financing of interregional spillover goods. We derive the
equilibrium pricing and enforcement rules for a n-region economy. We show that un-
der mild conditions on the pattern of substitution between spillover goods and con-
trary to the 2-region case, the decentralized equilibrium cannot be Pareto improved by
coordinated policy changes. However, decentralized equilibria are suboptimal from
the point of view of utilitarian welfare. We characterize the direction of the distortion
for this case. The regions’ incentives for user-fee enforcement are ambiguous in gen-
eral. With only two regions and if regions only charge non-residents, however, there is
overinvestment in user-fee enforcement in the decentralized equilibrium. For the case
of a Tullock enforcement function and linear demand for the spillover goods we show
that welfare is u-shaped in a parameter that measures the technological advantage of
user-fee enforcement.
Keywords Public goods · Club goods · Contests · Fiscal federalism
JEL Classification D74 · H41 · H70 · K42
1 Introduction
The literature on fiscal decentralization focuses on the potential advantages and dis-
advantages of decentralized responsibilities for the provision of publicly provided
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goods.1 Tiebout-type models (Tiebout 1956) stress that the decentralized provision
of local public goods may be superior to centralized provision if the central agency is
constrained in the choice of instruments and voter-citizens are sufficiently mobile to
vote by feet. In a democracy, individuals with heterogeneous preferences may have
to accept compromises in the supply of public goods that may be overcome if they
sort according to preferences. This positive effect of decentralization depends on the
assumption, among others, that the goods provided by the regional authorities do not
create spillovers to other regions. Existing spillovers may prohibit the efficiency of
a decentralized solution even if individuals are perfectly sorted according to prefer-
ences. One way to internalize these potential externalities is to create a system of
interregional transfer payments. For a number of spillover goods, an alternative is to
charge resident and non-resident users a price for the use of regional spillover goods
(Fuest and Kolmar 2007). Two important aspects of user fees are the costs of running
these systems and the possibilities to discriminate prices with respect to user groups.
Similar to the case of tax compliance, rational individuals will try to find ways
to circumvent the payment of user fees. Therefore, the enforcement of user fees is
an economic activity where governments trade off benefits and costs. A prominent
example is the enforcement of road tolls. For example, Germany raises fees for the
use of the highway system by commercial trucks. The charge per kilometer varies
according to the number of axles and the vehicle’s emission category and ranges
between 9 and 14 cents per kilometer. This means that the fee for e.g. a Hamburg–
Munich trip (776 km) is between 69.84 and 108.64 Euros. Annual gross revenue was
3.4 billion Euros in 2007. The cost of operating the toll system is considerable and
amounts to an estimated 20 % of gross revenues. This number underestimates the
total costs of the system because it abstracts from the huge development and setup
costs. The system has a high degree of accuracy, estimated at 98 %. According to
this estimate, the technology employed to enforce the payment of user fees almost
completely prevents free riding, but the operative costs are substantial.2 There is a
current discussion to extend the system to non-commercial vehicles3 and roads other
than highways.4
Road tolls are a good example for the use of user fees with substantial enforcement
costs. The opposite is probably true for the case of higher education where enforc-
ing compliance is relatively easy. In addition, price discrimination is frequently ob-
served. In the USA, tuition costs vary from $5 000 to $30 000 per year. About $9 000
for resident students and $20 000 for international students. Canadian universities
charge around $9 000 for domestic and $25 500 for international students. In Europe,
several countries have been considering reforming higher education and moving to-
wards a system that charges users.5 In UK, the maximum tuition fee amount that can
1See Oates (1999) for a comprehensive survey of the literature.
2See the official homepage of the ministry, http://www.bmvbs.de/Verkehr/-,1430/Strasse.htm, for further
information.
3http://www.sueddeutsche.de/X5q382/4053084/Koalition-uneins-ueber-Pkw-Maut.html.
4http://www.faz.net/s/Rub0E9EEF84AC1E4A389A8DC6C23161FE44/Doc~
ED9945D97BF70466B95337AB1485506DB~ATpl~Ecommon~Scontent.html.
5A comparison can be found at http://www.studyineurope.eu/tuition-fees.
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be charged to EU students is £3 145 a year. Average tuition for domestic students is
around £3 000, and for international students about £10 000 a year.6 There is a current
debate about a sharp increase in tuition fees in the future.7 According to the rector’s
conference of Swiss universities, 5 out of 12 universities charge higher tuition fees
for foreigners, ranging from CHF 200 per annum at the University of Zurich to CHF
4000 at the Universita della Svizzera Italiana.8
The costs to enforce compliance seem to be relatively small compared to, for ex-
ample, road pricing, but they are, without doubt, larger than zero. For example the
establishment of procedures that become necessary to administer the fees is part of
the enforcement costs. This is also true for other examples of user-fee financing like
e.g. local and interregional public transport. More importantly, if investments follow
the usual marginal costs—marginal benefits logic, even small enforcement costs lead
to distortions elsewhere. In this paper we interpret the enforcement costs of user fees
as an equilibrium outcome where individual users invest resources to circumvent the
payment of user fees and the regional authorities invest resources to enforce them.
Different equilibrium levels of investment reflect different, good-specific technolo-
gies of enforcement. We therefore interpret the different patterns observed for the
different goods and services (e.g. road pricing and university education) as rational
outcomes for different enforcement technologies.
This paper builds on earlier work by Fuest and Kolmar (2007) who have explored
the strategic incentives to set user fees if two regions provide non-rival goods. A ma-
jor finding of their paper is that user fees can be either inefficiently low or inefficiently
high, depending on whether the spillover goods are substitutes or complements. Their
analysis, however, is restricted to two regions and perfect and costless enforceability
of user fees. It turns out that under a mild condition their results do not readily carry
over to the n-region case. If all spillover goods are either substitutes or complements
to each other, the 2-region case is representative for the n-region case, but as soon as
some spillover goods are complements and some are substitutes, there is no room for
Pareto-improving policy coordination. It can, however, be shown that in these mixed
cases the decentralized equilibrium is suboptimal from the point of view of utilitarian
welfare. If one is willing to apply this criterion, a measure of average substitutability
determines whether user fees are suboptimally high or low.
Whether or not spillover goods are all substitutes or complements depends on the
good or service at hand. It can be argued that education services offered by univer-
sities in different regions are substitutes. However, the pattern of substitutability be-
tween roads depends crucially on geographic peculiarities. If, for example, a haulage
company wants to ship freight from the port of Rotterdam in the Netherlands to Basel
at the Swiss–German–French border, it has to use the Dutch road system but has the
choice between continuing via France or Germany.
As a novel aspect of this paper, we analyze the enforcement of user fees as an
economic activity. Contrary to standard models that either assume that exclusion is
6http://education.guardian.co.uk/students/internationalstudents/page/0„1941450,00.html.
7http://www.guardian.co.uk/education/2011/feb/06/univerisites-fee-charge-students.
8http://www.crus.ch/information-programme/studieren-in-der-schweiz.html#8_Kosten.
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impossible and the market mechanism cannot be applied (public goods), or that ex-
clusion is possible and does not create economic costs (club goods), exclusion is the
result of an investment decision that can be analyzed using standard opportunity-
costs arguments. Surprisingly there are very few articles that explicitly analyze the
production process and the associated costs of exclusion.9 One exception from this
observation is the growing literatures on law enforcement (see Polinsky and Shavell
2000 for a survey) and on anarchy and conflict.10 We borrow from the literature on
anarchy and conflict when focusing on the process of exclusion in this paper. We in-
terpret exclusion as a contest where the regional authority can invest in enforcement
and the potential users can invest in appropriation. Both, investments in enforcement
and appropriation determine the fraction of the spillover good for which exclusion is
possible and a fraction where individuals will free ride.
The paper is complemented by an appendix (Appendix C) where we develop fur-
ther insights into the economic mechanisms underlying the enforcement of user fees.
We use a Tullock (1980) conflict and a Singh and Vives (1984) utility function that
generates linear demand functions. Both functions are standard in the relevant fields
of research (i.e. endogenous property rights11 and industrial organization). We pa-
rameterize the model with respect to a measure of relative superiority (inferiority)
of investments in enforcement of user fees compared to investments in free riding.
The resulting equilibrium utility levels turn out to be u-shaped in this parameter. The
reason for this surprising finding is that the resource costs of enforcement are largest
if enforcement and free-riding investments have similar productivities. Even though
free riding is smaller than in a situation with less effective enforcement technology,
the resource costs necessary to prevent additional free riding overcompensate any
potential gains.
In addition it can be shown that two different enforcement regimes exist, depend-
ing on the relative effectiveness of enforcement. If enforcement is relatively difficult,
free riding occurs in equilibrium. With increasing effectiveness of enforcement, free
riding is continuously reduced and replaced by regular user-fee demand, this process
is complemented by a steady increase in user fees. From a certain effectiveness of en-
forcement onwards, free riding can be completely deterred, and the consumption of
the spillover good is exclusively user-fee financed. Interestingly, despite the fact that
exclusion is perfect, user fees continue to rise if enforcement becomes more effective.
The reason for this monotonicity even with perfect enforcement is that investments
are set as to make users indifferent between paying user fees and investing in free
riding. Hence, an increase in user fees increases the temptation for free riding, and
regions take this effect into consideration. Given that the demand for spillover goods
is usually decreasing in user fees, this shows that better enforcement technologies
have an ambiguous effect of overall welfare. On the one hand, the resource costs
9For exemptions from this rule see Clotfelter (1977, 1978) and Laux-Mieselbach (1988).
10The literature on contests has recently been surveyed by Corchón (2007), Garfinkel and Skaperdas
(2007), and Konrad (2009).
11An axiomatic foundation for the Tullock function for group contests can be found in Skaperdas (1996).
An interpretation of the Tullock contest as a perfectly discriminatory noisy ranking contest can be found
in Fu and Lu (2008).
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of enforcement go down. But on the other hand, total consumption of the spillover
goods goes down as well, which is wasteful given their non-rival nature.
Theses findings complement the earlier literature on excludable non-rival goods.
Brito and Oakland (1980) compare the provision of excludable non-rival goods by a
monopolist that is restricted in its ability to discriminate prices between consumers.
They find two types of inefficiencies compared to the first best. The monopolist will
not provide the efficient quantity of the non-rival good, and he will exclude some of
the consumers from the consumption of part of the good. Similar results are obtained
by Fraser (1996) and Janeba and Swope (2001) who analyze user charges in different
applications. Both papers get positive exclusion in equilibrium. The reason for their
result is that the supplier of the public good is not allowed to discriminate prices
between different users and is therefore restricted to Cournot-price setting. These
inefficiencies are of course closely linked to the available pricing strategies. First-best
efficiency would require individualized Lindahl prices. A market mechanism could
implement those prices only by means of a monopoly with the ability to perfectly
discriminate prices among users.
Our approach contributes to the economic theory of decentralization because the
inefficiencies of decentralized user-fee policies are idiosyncratic to decentralization
and could be avoided by either centralized tax financing or centralized user-fee set-
ting. This does not mean that we have established an argument in favor of central-
ization because centralized authorities have their own idiosyncratic sources of inef-
ficiencies. It is therefore a question of comparing the different types of transaction
costs in order to determine the optimal hierarchical structure of governments.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Sect. 2 we present the formal model and the
first-order conditions characterizing the equilibrium. This equilibrium and its wel-
fare properties is analyzed in Sect. 3. Section 4 concludes. Proofs and the functional
specification of the model can be found in Appendices A, B and C.
2 The model
Economy and governments The economy is divided into n regions, i = 1, . . . , n.
For simplicity we assume that every region is populated by a representative individ-
ual and has a local government that maximizes the utility of the regional resident. The
government provides two goods. The first one is a local public good denoted by gi .
This good only benefits domestic citizens and exclusion is impossible. The second
one is a non-rival good which has the physical quality to also benefit foreigners and
for which exclusion is possible but costly. The quantity of the second good produced
by region i is denoted by ciS . For simplicity the production of the two goods is as-
sumed to be linear in expenditures.
In order to finance its activities, region i can levy user fees, pi = {p1i , . . . , pni }
per unit of the spillover good i demanded by domestic and foreign users, ciD =
{ci1D, . . . , cinD}. Denote by pi = {pi1, . . . , pin} the user-fee vector faced by a res-
ident of region i, and by p = {p1, . . . , pn} = {p1, . . . , pn} the user-fee matrix.
Analogously denote by ciD = {c1iD, . . . , cniD} the demand by resident i, and by
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cD = {c1D, . . . , cnD} = {c1D, . . . , cnD} the demand matrix. Since exclusion of residents
with respect to gi is impossible, no user fees can be levied on gi .
As mentioned in the introduction, exclusion is a costly activity. If the government
does not invest in exclusion, individuals will free ride on the supply of the public
good ciS , and the government cannot levy fees to finance its expenditures. In order
to induce the payment, user fees have to be enforced. We assume that enforcement
generates (endogenous) costs ei , e = {e1, . . . , en}, for example the patrolling of po-
lice cars on the streets, the installation of toll booths, or simply the establishment of
procedures that become necessary to administer the fees. We assume that investments
improve enforcement of user fees against potential free riders from all regions. De-
pending on the investments for the enforcement of user fees, user fees themselves,
and other technological constraints, the agents of the other regions can invest part
of their resources ai = {a1i , . . . , ani }, a = {a1, . . . , an}, (appropriation) to figure out
ways to circumvent the enforcement measures by the other regions. For example the
agents can use part of their time planning how to travel through the other region in
order not to be detected, hiding from controls, etc. Contrary to defensive investments
we assume that these investments are region specific.
The spillover good is non-rival in consumption between different users. However,
each individual user has two potential “gateways” for its consumption. It can try to
free-ride by investing aji , or it can legally buy the spillover good by paying user
fees. The total consumption of an individual is then the sum of free-riding and legal
consumption.12 More formally, enforcement and appropriative investments influence
exclusion as follows: given investments e and a, πji = πji (ej , aji ) is the fraction of
spillover good j for which individual i is successful in free riding, whereas govern-
ment j is successful in exclusion for the fraction (1 − πji (ej , aji )) of the spillover
good. Given the total supply of the spillover good cjS, cS = {c1S, . . . , cnS}, and the
quantities demanded by domestic and foreign users, cjD , the quantity of spillover good
j actually consumed by individual i is given by
z
j
i = πji
(
ej , a
j
i
)
cjS + cjiD. (1)
Total consumption is therefore the sum of “free-rider” and “user-fee” consumption.
Note that total consumption of spillover good j by user i cannot be larger than its total
supply, zji ≤ cjS , which yields the following constraint for user-fee consumption:
(
1 − πji
(
ej , a
j
i
))
cjS ≥ cjiD. (2)
12A good example is public broadcasting in countries like Switzerland and Germany where “Rundfunkge-
bühren”, a form of user fees, have to be paid as soon as a household owns a radio or TV set. Broadcasting
is of course non-rival in consumption between different users. However, for every single user there exists a
tradeoff between free-riding and paying user fees, and the total consumption will typically fall short of the
total supply. In order to enforce user fees, both countries have established agencies with the permission to
administer and collect the fees (Billag AG in Switzerland and Gebühreneinzugszenrale in Germany). They
are empowered to carry out random-checks to ensure compliance, which makes free riding costly from the
point of view of the individual user because he has to invest in precautionary measures to prevent being
detected.
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We assume that πji (0, a
j
i ) = 1, i.e. if the government does not invest in exclusion,
households will be able to benefit from the entire supply of the good, irrespective of
the quantity they buy (cjiD). Analogously we assume that πji (ej ,0) = 0 as long as
ej > 0. Moreover,
∂π
j
i
∂ej
≤ 0, ∂
2π
j
i
∂(ej )2
≥ 0, lim
ej→∞
π
j
i = 0, (3)
∂π
j
i
∂a
j
i
≥ 0, ∂
2π
j
i
∂(a
j
i )
2
≤ 0, lim
a
j
i →∞
π
j
i = 1, (4)
i.e. there is a declining “marginal effectiveness” of enforcement and appropriation.
This exclusion technology resembles a contest-success function (CSF). The most
widely used functional specification of such a function is given by the modified
Tullock-CSF
π
(
ej , a
j
i
) =
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
a
j
i
a
j
i +θej
, ∃aji , ej > 0,
1 aji = ej = 0,
(5)
where θ measures the relative effectiveness of appropriation and defense.13 This
function will be used in the examples throughout the paper.
The budget constraint of government i is
n∑
j=1
p
j
i c
i
jD + t = ciS + ei + gi. (6)
The left-hand side of the equation measures total revenues of the region levied from
domestic and foreign users. To have a simplified exposition we assume that each gov-
ernment levies exogenous taxes t ≥ 0 from the regional individual that can be used to
finance part of the provision of the spillover and the regional public good. The right-
hand side of the equation measures total expenditures of the region. They include
expenditures for the supply of the spillover good, expenditures for the enforcement
of the user fees, and expenditures for the public good.
Individuals The representative individual in region i derives utility from the con-
sumption of a private good, xi , from consumption of the local public good, gi , and
from the consumption of the spillover goods provided by the regions, zji . W.l.o.g we
assume that the price of the private good is normalized to one. The utility functions
of the representative individuals are given by ui(xi, zi , gi) which are assumed to be
strictly quasi-concave, twice continuously differentiable and weakly separable be-
tween gi and the other arguments. Individuals i, j are called identical if they have
identical utility functions.
13See Grossman (2001) for further reference.
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The individual is endowed with a quantity X of the numéraire good. Given user
fees pi , exclusion investments e, and the domestic and foreign supply of the spillover
goods cS , the budget constraint of a resident of region i is
xi +
n∑
j=1
pij c
j
iD +
n∑
j=1
a
j
i = X − t. (7)
Sequence of events We consider a two-stage game. At stage 1 every region non-
cooperatively determines its defensive activities, spillover-goods supply, user fees,
and local public-goods supply, Ti = {ei, ciS,pi, gi}, subject to the constraints that
the government budget balances and that, for all i and j , effective consumption of
the spillover goods cannot exceed supply. i.e. cjS ≥ zji . At stage 2, individuals max-
imize their utility by the choice of demand of the private good, xi , the demand of
the spillover goods, ciD , and appropriation, ai . The game is solved by backwards
induction.
Stage 2 An individual i maximizes utility given (7), (1), (2), and non-negativity
constraints for user-fee consumption and appropriation,
max
ciD,ai ,xi
ui
(
xi, z
1
i , . . . , z
n
i , gi
)
s.t. xi +
n∑
j=1
pij c
j
iD +
n∑
j=1
a
j
i = X − t,
∧zji = πji
(
ej , a
j
i
)
cjS + cjiD, j = 1, . . . , n, (8)
∧(1 − πji
(
ej , a
j
i
))
cjS ≥ cjiD, j = 1, . . . , n,
∧cjiD ≥ 0 ∧ aji ≥ 0, j = 1, . . . , n.
Standard Kuhn–Tucker techniques can be used to derive the necessary conditions for
the individual utility maximum, depending on the parameter values from the point
of view of the individual. For future reference denote by λi the Lagrange multi-
plier associated with budget constraint (7) and by ρji , ji , σ ji the Lagrange multipli-
ers (or complementary slackness parameters) associated with the supply constraint
(1 − πji (ej , aji ))cjS ≥ cjiD and non-negativity constraints cjiD ≥ 0, aji ≥ 0. Through-
out the paper we use the convention to call a constraint binding if the associated
complementary slackness parameter is strictly positive. We call a constraint weakly
binding if the associated complementary slackness parameter is positive or zero and
the constraint holds with equality. We call a constraint not binding if it is not weakly
binding.
Denote by MRSji (zi , xi, gi) := ∂ui∂zji /
∂ui
∂xi
the marginal rate of substitution be-
tween consumption of the spillover good and consumption of the rival good.
MRTji (ej , a
j
i , cjS) := ∂π
j
i (ej ,a
j
i )
∂a
j
i
cjS/1 is the marginal rate of transformation between
the rival and spillover good using the channel of free riding.
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Table 1 Necessary conditions for the individual optimization problem
I II III IV V VI
(1 − πj
i
)cjS − cjiD =0 =0 =0 >0 >0 >0
a
j
i
=0 >0 >0 =0 >0 >0
c
j
iD
>0 >0 =0 >0 >0 =0
MRSj
i
≥pi
j
≥pi
j
≥pi
j
=pi
j
=pi
j
=pi
j
MRTj
i
≤1/pi
j
=1/pi
j
≥1/pi
j
≤1/pi
j
=1/pi
j
≥1/pi
j
To gain intuition it is best to start with case V where both, free riding and legal
demand of the spillover good are positive and the supply constraint is not binding.
In this case, the marginal rate of substitution is equal to the relative price of the
spillover good, MRSji = pij , and free-riding and legal consumption are balanced in a
way as to equalize their marginal returns, MRTji = 1/pij . This is the standard case of
a completely interior solution. All the other cases list potential corner solutions. They
will become important in the analysis of optimal government policies later on.
Cases I–III comprise all situations where the supply constraint is weakly binding,
(1 − πji )cjS − cjiD = 0, which implies that the individual would like to consume
(weakly) more than what is actually in supply.
• In case I, the user fee is sufficiently small that the individual decides not to free
ride. This case resembles the standard peak-load problem with binding capacity
constraint.
• In case II, the individual mixes between free riding on and buying the spillover
good. In this case, the decreasing effectiveness of appropriation implies that aji
is uniquely determined for every pij . This property will turn out to be important
for the comparative-static properties of the model because the binding capacity
constraint links demand and free-riding activities.
• Case III is the opposite to case I. Here, the user fee is so high and the enforcement
activities are so low that the individual specializes in free riding.
Cases IV–VI, on the other hand, comprise all situations where the supply constraint
is not binding, (1 − πji )cjS − cjiD > 0, total consumption of the spillover good falls
short of its total supply. Case V has already been analyzed, so we can restrict attention
to cases IV and VI now.
• In case IV, enforcement activities are sufficiently high to deter free riding (as in
case I), but the user fee is too high to allow for a complete utilization of the spillover
good.
• Case VI is again the opposite to case IV. Here, the user fee is so high and the
enforcement activities are so low that the individual specializes in free riding but
does not succeed to utilize the spillover good completely.
Cases I and IV share the property that the individual does not free ride. We will
call this type of solution deterrence equilibrium in the following. For the exam-
ple of a Tullock function, (5), the optimal investment in appropriation is aji =
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max[0,
√
cjSejp
i
j θ −ej θ ], which implies that aji = 0 ⇔ ej ≥ cjS ·pij /θ : both, higher
prices and a larger supply have to be accompanied by an increase in enforcement in
order to induce the individual not to invest in appropriation. The opposite holds true
for θ : larger values of θ make appropriation more difficult, which implies that en-
forcement can be reduced.
The solution to the household’s maximization problem gives rise to demand and
appropriation functions cjiD(p
i, e, cS, gi), xi(p
i, e, cS, gi), a
j
i (p
i, e, cS, gi), and an
indirect-utility function vi(pi, e, cS, gi).
Stage 1 The governments of the regions set their policies at stage 1. We de-
rive the equilibrium assuming that the governments set their policy instruments si-
multaneously and non-cooperatively. A decentralized Nash equilibrium is a vector
{Ti}i=1,...,N such that all regions maximize utility given the policy parameters of the
other regions.
Given the budget constraint (6), the optimization problem of region i is as follows:
max
ciS ,ei ,pi ,gi
vi
(
pi, e, cS, gi
)
s.t. gi + ciS + ei =
n∑
j=1
p
j
i c
i
jD
(
pj , e, cS, gj
) + t.
(9)
Using the Envelope Theorem, the Kuhn–Tucker conditions of the associated La-
grangean with respect to the policy parameters are as follows (μi denotes the
Lagrange-multiplier associated with the budget constraint):14
ei : ∂u
∂zii
∂πii
∂ei
ciS + μi
[
n∑
j=1
p
j
i
∂cijD
∂ei
− 1
]
= 0, (10)
ciS : ∂u
∂zii
πii + μi
[
n∑
j=1
p
j
i
∂cijD
∂ciS
− 1
]
= 0, (11)
pii : − λiciiD + μi
[
ciiD + pii
∂ciiD
∂pii
]
= 0, (12)
p
j
i : μi
[
cijD + pji
∂cijD
∂p
j
i
]
= 0, j 	= i, (13)
gi : ∂u
∂gi
− μi = 0. (14)
Some of the conditions are straightforward extensions of the two-region model with
exogenous exclusion of free riding developed by Fuest and Kolmar (2007). We will
very briefly discuss them here and focus instead on the novel aspect of multiple re-
gions and the endogenous enforcement of user fees.
14The corresponding second-order conditions are assumed to be fulfilled.
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3 Analysis of the decentralized Nash equilibrium
In this section we analyze the decentralized policies and whether they are optimal for
the country as a whole. If this is not the case, a potential for welfare-enhancing policy
coordination arises. We restrict attention to user fees and exclusion investments. The
welfare analysis is carried out under the assumption that user fees and exclusion in-
vestments marginally depart from the decentralized equilibrium and that investments
in exclusion (the following case 3) and user fees (the following cases 1 and 2) are
positive. Moreover, the government budget constraint is balanced by adjusting the
supply of gi . We denote by Li (·) the Lagrange function associated with optimization
problem (9).
3.1 User fees paid by domestic citizens
We focus on user fee pjj in the following. (12) implies that the optimal decentralized
pricing rule with respect to pjj is as follows:
p
j
j
c
j
jD
∂c
j
jD
∂p
j
j
− λj − μj
μj
≤ 0. (15)
This condition implies that the user fee will be set as to equalize the demand elastic-
ity with a measure for the marginal costs of public funds, (λj − μj )/μj ≤ 0, in an
interior solution. If the marginal costs of public funds are zero, λj = μj , domestic
user fees should therefore be equal to zero (Fuest and Kolmar 2007). We assume that
the marginal costs of public funds are not equal to zero in the following.
In order to determine optimal user fees for the different scenarios described in
I–VI, note first that case I can never be an equilibrium: if the supply constraint is
binding, ∂cjjD/∂p
j
j = 0, and it is always profitable to increase the user fee. By the
same token, scenarios III and VI can be ruled out because they imply no revenues
from the user fee, which can always be avoided by lowering pjj to almost zero.
Case IV resembles the model by Fuest and Kolmar (2007): without free riding,
the effect of pjj on c
j
jD is only determined by MRS
j
j = pjj and therefore exclusively
driven by the structure of the utility function. If the spillover good is normal, the
income effect cannot dominate the price effect, and demand is decreasing in the rel-
evant user fee. In case V, however, a change in the user fee has an additional effect
on free riding (appropriation effect). The appropriation effect is determined by opti-
mality condition (∂πjj /∂a
j
j )cjS = 1/pjj which has to hold in addition to MRSjj = pjj .
Given decreasing marginal effectiveness of appropriation, an increase in the user fee
increases appropriation, and the appropriation effect is thereby ceteris paribus nega-
tive in the sense that it reduces demand.
In case II, the capacity constraint is binding and free riding occurs, which implies
that cjjD = (1 − πjj )cjS . Given that (∂πjj /∂ajj )cjS = 1/pjj , the effect of a change
in pjj on c
j
jD is ∂c
j
jD/∂a
j
j = −(∂πjj /∂ajj )cjS < 0 because of the strict concavity of
π
j
j : the change in consumption is completely driven by the curvature of the exclusion
technology.
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The differences to the case of exogenous and perfect exclusion are intuitive: A case
with binding capacity constraints in the sense that MRSjj > p
j
j can never occur in
a model with perfect exclusion (see the above discussion of case I). In can occur
in a model with endogenous exclusion because an increase in the user fee will be
“retaliated” by an increase in free riding which reduces demand. The implied revenue
effect can therefore be negative, and it is not clear that user fees will be driven up to
the point where MRSjj = pjj . In a case with non-binding capacity constraint, higher
fees also increase the pressure on free riding, and the optimal rule should take this
into consideration by lowering fees. Hence, endogenous free riding has a dampening
effect on domestic user fees.
One can use the Envelope Theorem to determine the effect of an increase in pjj on
region i 	= j :
dLi
dp
j
j
= ∂Li
∂p
j
j
= μipji
∂cijD
∂p
j
j
for j 	= i. Hence, if a utilitarian criterion for the evaluation of a change in dpjj is
applied, we get
∑
i 	=j
∂Li
∂p
j
j
=
∑
i 	=j
μip
j
i
∂cijD
∂p
j
j
(16)
as the aggregate welfare effect of a change in pjj , evaluated at the decentralized equi-
librium. It is useful to have the following definitions.
Definition 1 Spillover good i is a substitute (complement) for spillover good j for
individual j if ∂cijD/∂p
j
j > (<)0.
Definition 2 Spillover goods i 	= j are an average substitute (average comple-
ment) for spillover good j for individual j if ∑i 	=j αi∂cijD/∂pjj > (<)0, αi ∈
[0,1],∑i αi = 1.
These definitions and the above condition can be used to show the following result.
The proof can be found in Appendix A.
Result 1 Assume not all supply constraints for individual j are binding, ∃i 	= j :
(1 − πij )ciS − cijD > 0. (i) An increase in user fee pjj increases (reduces) utilitarian
welfare if and only if the foreign spillover-goods demand of region j , cijD , i 	= j , is
an average substitute (complement) for the domestic spillover good cjjD with weights
αi = μipji /
∑
k 	=j μkp
j
k . (ii) A change in user fee pjj can never be a Pareto im-
provement for regions i 	= j if there exist at least two regions k, l 	= j such that
sgn[∂ckjD/∂pjj ] 	= sgn[∂cljD/∂pjj ].
An increase in the user fee paid by domestic citizens creates a fiscal externality
because demand for domestic and foreign spillover goods is interdependent. If the
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domestically supplied good is a substitute for all foreign goods, the increase in the
fee for domestic users induces them to increase their demand for the foreign spillover
good, which increases user-fee revenues and therefore raises welfare abroad. If the
goods are all complements, however, the externality caused by an increase in user
fees is negative because an increase in foreign prices is partly compensated by a
decrease in domestic demand. This reduces foreign revenues, and foreign welfare
is negatively affected. This effect is closely related to the so-called anti-commons
problem.15 Up to this point our model extends the result in Fuest and Kolmar (2007)
in a straightforward way.
In the case where not all other spillover goods are perceived as either complements
or substitutes, the analysis departs from Fuest and Kolmar (2007). It is still possible to
make a unanimous judgment based on utilitarian welfare16 that allows to aggregate
the heterogeneous effects to some aggregate measure of net substitutability or net
complementarity. However, any change in pjj that makes at least one region better off
makes some other region worse off. As a consequence, there is no way to achieve a
Pareto-improvement relative to the decentralized equilibrium if at least two regions
with opposing effects exist. For an example think of the road system of three regions.
Region 1’s roads are a substitute to region 2’s roads and vice versa, and both are a
complement to region 3’s roads.17 In this case, an increase in tolls by region 1 is
likely to increase demand in region 2 and (if region 1’s and region 2’s roads are not
perfect substitutes) reduce demand in region 3.
The case of binding supply constraints follows readily:
Result 1a Assume all supply constraints for individual j are binding, ∀i 	= j : (1 −
π
j
i )cjS − cjiD = 0. An increase in user fee pjj has no effect on individual or utilitarian
welfare.
The intuition for this result is intuitive: If individual j demands all foreign
spillover goods up to the supply constraint, a marginal change in pjj has neither an ef-
fect on this individuals’ free-riding behavior (because the relative price of free riding
on foreign spillover goods remains unchanged) nor on his demand. Hence, foreign
user-fee revenues remain unchanged.
3.2 Coordination of user fees paid by foreign citizens
It is straightforward to check that optimal user fees with respect to non-residents
are set as to maximize revenues (with the appropriate marginal costs depending on
whether the supply constraint is binding or not, Fuest and Kolmar 2007). Given that
this pricing rule must incorporate the endogeneity of free riding, the appropriation
effect has to be included in the pricing rule. As before, the appropriation effect has a
15See Buchanan and Yoon (2000).
16And any other criterion of justice based on welfarism as well, of course.
17To be more specific think for example of freight at the port of Rotterdam that has to ultimately be shipped
to Basel at the Swiss–French–German Border. The freight has to pass through the Netherlands but can then
be either shipped via France or Germany.
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dampening effect on domestic user fees because higher user fees make larger invest-
ments in free riding profitable, which partly crowds out “legal” consumption cjiD .
With respect to overall welfare, the intuition given in the last paragraph should in
principle also apply to the case of user fees paid by non-domestic users. However, the
problem is different because contrary to the case of domestic user fees, the foreign
direct-utility effect of an increase in user fees for non-residents is not internalized by
the domestic government. The implied monopoly prices tend to be too high and are
therefore a source of inefficiency of their own.
The welfare effect of a change in pij , j 	= i is qualitatively different for region i
and regions k 	= i 	= j (we can again neglect the effect on j because of the Envelope
Theorem):
dLi
dpij
= −λicjiD + μipii
∂ciiD
∂pij
, (17)
dLk
dpij
= μkpik
∂ckiD
∂pij
. (18)
The first term in (17) measures the direct, negative effect of monopoly pricing on the
utility of region i. This effect is absent in region k, which is influenced only by the
induced change in region i’s demand structure. Hence, the direct effect reinforces the
total effect if the goods are complements but mitigates it if the goods are substitutes.
The utilitarian sum of welfare effects of a change in pij is then given as
∑
k 	=j
dLk
dpij
= −λicjiD +
∑
k 	=j
μkp
i
k
∂ckiD
∂pij
. (19)
This leads to the following.
Result 2 (a) Assume not all supply constraints for individual i are binding, ∃k 	= j :
(1−πki )ckS − ckiD > 0. (i) An increase in user fee pij reduces utilitarian welfare if the
spillover-goods demand by individual i, ckiD , i 	= j, k 	= j , is an average complement
for the spillover-good demand cjiD . There is no clear-cut result for the case of aver-
age substitutes. (ii) A change in user fee pij need not be a Pareto improvement for
regions k 	= j if there exist at least two regions k, l 	= j such that sgn[∂ckjD/∂pij ] 	=
sgn[∂cljD/∂pij ]. It can never be a Pareto improvement for regions k 	= j if there exist
at least two regions k, l 	= i, j such that sgn[∂ckjD/∂pij ] 	= sgn[∂cljD/∂pij ]. (b) If all
supply constraints for individual i are binding, an increase in user fee pjj reduces
individual as well as utilitarian welfare.
The proof is analogue to that of Result 1 and is therefore omitted here. The re-
sult shows that the step from two to more than two regions is in fact crucial. Only
if all regions perceive the spillover goods of all other regions qualitatively similar
as either substitutes or complements or substitutes, the results by Fuest and Kolmar
Endogenous free riding and the decentralized user-fee financing 183
(2007) generalize to the n-region case. If regions can qualitatively differ in their per-
ceptions of the other regions’ spillover goods there is no room for user-fee changes,
which makes these regions unambiguously better off. In these cases, a utilitarian wel-
fare criterion replaces the substitutes–complements rule by a rule that focusses on a
concept of average substitute/complement. In the general case with binding capacity
constraints and appropriation in equilibrium, the additional appropriation effect also
works along the same lines as before.
3.3 Coordination of investments to prevent free riding
What is the scope for welfare enhancing coordination of enforcement policies? To
understand the strategic effects resulting from this investment decision, we analyze
the effect of a change in exclusion investments ej on welfare in region i:
dLi
dej
= ∂ui
∂z
j
i
∂π
j
i
∂ej
+
n∑
k=1
μip
k
i
∂cikD
∂ej
(20)
for i 	= j . The first term is unambiguously negative in cases II and V because the
increase in enforcement reduces free-rider consumption. It is zero in case IV where
free riding from i has been successfully prevented by high enough enforcement lev-
els. The second effect is a budget effect because of the implied change in the demand
structure. In general, no predictions about the sign of this effect can be made.
To fix ideas assume that utility is linear in the consumption of the private good for
all individuals. In this case, an increase in ej unambiguously increases demands cjkD
for all k. The budget effect for region i results if these demand changes by region
k affect the demand for spillover good i. ∂cikD/∂ej measures the change in demand
for spillover good i by resident k induced by a change in region j ’s enforcement.
Theoretically, this effect can be positive as well as negative. k’s demand for good
i tends to go up if cjkD and c
i
kD are complements and tends to go down if they are
substitutes. Hence, the direct negative effect on i’s utility is reinforced if the spillover
goods are substitutes. In the case that they are complements, however, the budget
effect works counter to the direct effect such that no prediction about the welfare
consequences in i can be made.
It is instructive to start with an analysis of the two-region case for an analysis of
the efficiency of the decentralized equilibrium.
Result 3 Assume there are two regions, i and j , and domestic users are not excluded
from the use of the spillover good, pii = pjj = 0, or user fees are perfectly enforced
against domestic users. Then, exclusion investments are inefficiently high if free rid-
ing occurs in a decentralized equilibrium. If, on the other hand, there is no free riding
in the decentralized equilibrium, exclusion is efficient.
The result gives a nice example for the intuitive case that the ability of a region
to raise revenues from non-residents creates an incentive to invest more in exclusion
technologies than socially optimal because the region does not internalize the nega-
tive externality that comes with reduced free riding. However, the result also points
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to the limitations of this intuition. If user fees are set as to allow some degree of
free riding, an increase in enforcement in j can increase the demand of region i’s
spillover good. If the latter effect is sufficiently strong, region i can in fact profit from
increased enforcement in region j .
It is impossible to derive general results for pii > 0,p
j
j > 0 because an increase
in ej induces complex spillover effects that lack a general structure. A change in ej
will have an impact on the demands for spillover good j , which in turn influences the
demands for spillover good i. The sign of the former effect is ambiguous in general.
In addition, the induced effects on the demand of spillover good i depend on whether
both goods are substitutes or complements. For example assume that an increase in
enforcement in j increases domestic demand, and that foreign demand is a substitute
(complement). Then, an increase in ej has a negative (positive) effect on region i’s
budget constraint. Therefore, no general conclusion can be drawn.
It follows from the above discussion that it cannot be expected to get general
results for the case of more than two regions. The aggregate (utilitarian) effect of a
change in ej for a utilitarian welfare measure is
∑
i 	=j
dLi
dej
=
∑
i 	=j
∂ui
∂z
j
i
∂π
j
i
∂ej
+
∑
i 	=j
(
n∑
k=1
μip
k
i
∂cikD
∂ej
)
. (21)
The general case does not even have a regular structure if one assumes that domestic
users are not charged for the use of spillover goods. An increase in ej will in general
have an effect of individual k’s demand for spillover good i. These cross effects (that
are absent in the case of only two regions) create budget effects in region i that do
not allow any general conclusion.
4 Conclusions
This paper has extended the framework for thinking about the decentralized incen-
tives to set user fees for the financing of interregional spillover goods that has been
developed by Fuest and Kolmar (2007). It extends the analysis by allowing for n
regions and by interpreting the process of exclusion as an economic activity where
potential free riders and regional authorities invest resources to be able to free ride
or to prevent free riding. Not surprisingly, decentralized policies cause a number of
externalities that lead to the strategic setting of fees. Hence, economic integration is
likely to cause problems for price mechanisms which are similar to those faced by tax
mechanisms. A shift towards user-fee financing of publicly provided goods is there-
fore no way out of the problem of tax competition. The extension to more than two re-
gions reveals that policy coordination does not lead to Pareto-improvements if regions
are heterogeneous with respect to their pattern of complementarity/substitutability
between spillover goods. However, a clear-cut welfare comparison between decen-
tralized and coordinated policies is possible if one is willing to accept a utilitarian
criterion. In this case, an index of average substitutability between spillover goods
turns out to be decisive for the evaluation of decentralized user fees.
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In the appendix we further explore the functioning of the exclusion mechanism.
For the case of two regions, decentralized investments in exclusion are too high if
only non-domestic users are charged for their use of spillover goods. Unfortunately
it has been impossible to show robust results for the general case of n regions and/or
user fees for domestic users. If exclusion is an economic activity, our analysis further
reveals that the total costs of exclusion are hump shaped in some parameter that
represents the relative effectiveness of exclusion compared to free-riding investments.
This result shows that better enforcement technologies need not improve economic
welfare, on the contrary, they may encourage both sides, potential free riders as well
as regional authorities, to engage more heavily in the contest for the use of spillover
goods.
Appendix A: Proof of Result 1
Proof The welfare effect of a change in pjj for region i is given by
μip
j
i
∂cijD
∂p
j
j
, (A.1)
which measures the additional utility of an i-resident resulting from a change in user-
fee revenues collected from individual j (μi is the marginal utility of an additional
unit of government revenue in region i).
(i) Assume there exists a region i such that ∂cijD/∂pjj 	= 0∀i 	= j . Then,
∑
i 	=j
μip
j
i
∂cijD
∂p
j
j
(A.2)
is the sum of additional utilities for all regions i 	= j , which implies that utili-
tarian welfare increases (decreases) in pjj if (A.2) is positive (negative). Define
αi = μipji /
∑
k 	=j μkp
j
k with αi ∈ [0,1],
∑
i 	=j αi = 1. It follows immediately from
(A.2) that utilitarian welfare increases (decreases) in pjj iff
∑
i 	=j
αi
∂cijD
∂p
j
j
> (<)0,
which are the definitions for average substitutes and average complements.
(ii) Given that μipji > 0∀i 	= j (remember that pji = 0 can never be optimal for
a region i) the direction of the regional welfare effect is determined by the substi-
tutability or complementarity of this regions’ spillover good for user j . If ∃i, k such
that ∂cijD/∂p
j
j > 0, ∂c
k
jD/∂p
j
j < 0, region i’s welfare goes up whereas region k’s
welfare goes down, hence a change in user fees can never be a Pareto-improvement.
Finally, if the supply constraint is binding in region i, (1 − πji )ciS − cijD =
0 ∧ ρij > 0, it must be that ∂cijD/∂pjj = 0 irrespective of whether spillover goods
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j and i a substitutes or complements for individual j . Hence, at least one supply
constraint has not to be binding to create positive or negative externalities between
regions. 
Appendix B: Proof of Result 3
Proof With only two regions, (20) measures the aggregate externality imposed by
region j and simplifies to
dLi
dej
= ∂ui
∂z
j
i
∂π
j
i
∂ej
+ μipii
∂ciiD
∂ej
+ μipji
∂cijD
∂ej
.
(i) Assume that domestic users consume the spillover good for free, pii = pjj = 0,
which implies that the second term on the right-hand side of the above equation
is equal to zero. Furthermore, without exclusion of domestic users, a change in
ej leaves the budget constraint of a j -resident unchanged. It follows directly that
∂cijD/∂ej = 0. Hence, only the direct negative effect (first term on the right-hand
side) remains. (ii) Assume that enforcement is perfect. In this case, an increase in
ej has no direct negative effect on i’s utility, and it cannot influence the demand of
spillover goods (which has been determined under conditions of perfect enforcement
anyway). 
Appendix C: The role of the exclusion technology on the decentralized
equilibrium
In this appendix we further explore the economic mechanisms underlying the en-
forcement of user fees using a functional specification of the above model. The
fact that regions are in a position of monopolistic competition with respect to the
spillover goods creates a problem for any functional specification of the model be-
cause standard utility functions that generate iso-elastic demand functions yield no
interior solution for the monopoly problem. Basically one finds two classes of utility
functions that are used for a micro-foundation of Marshallian demand functions that
yield interior solutions for markets with imperfect competition, a generalized Stone–
Geary form (Yin 2001) and a class of linear quadratic functions (Singh and Vives
1984). Only the latter class generates interior solutions for the boundary case of zero
marginal costs of providing a good, which is essential to the problem at hand because
of the non-rival nature of the spillover good. We have therefore used a special case of
the function introduced by Singh and Vives (1984). Assume that there are two regions
i = 1,2. The representative individual in region i has the following utility function:
ui
(
xi, c
i
i , c
j
i , gi
) = xi + cii −
1
2
(
cii
)2 + cji −
1
2
(
c
j
i
)2 + gi. (C.1)
Note that this functional form implies that the individuals have a satiation point for the
spillover goods at cii = cji = 1. We employ the assumption—standard in the literature
Endogenous free riding and the decentralized user-fee financing 187
on Industrial Organization—that the marginal costs of producing the spillover goods
are equal to zero.18 This convention allows it to focus on the functioning of the price-
and exclusion mechanisms.
With marginal costs of zero, the Pareto-efficient quantities of the spillover goods
are equal to ciS = 1, their satiation levels. Note further that this quantity will also pro-
vided in the decentralized game: the voluntary-contributions game does not lead to
underprovision of the spillover goods. However, the decentralized equilibrium may
lead to inefficient investments in free riding and exclusion as well as to inefficient
exclusion in order to maximize revenues from non-resident users. We make the ad-
ditional assumption that domestic residents are not charged for their consumption of
the non-rival good, p11 = p22 = 0. Exclusion is only targeted against foreign users to
involve them in the financing of the non-rival good.
The exclusion technology is given by a standard Tullock contest-success func-
tion given in (5). Note that the parameter θ determines the relative effectivity of
investments in exclusion compared to investments in free riding. Larger values of θ ,
therefore, imply a more effective exclusion technology, and different empirical appli-
cations may differ with respect to the ability to enforce compliance. The enforcement
of user fees in education is, for example, relatively easy, implying a relatively large
value of θ , whereas the enforcement of user fees for roads is considerably more dif-
ficult, implying a smaller value of θ . We will explore the consequences of different
values of θ in detail in the following. We say that the exclusion technology is balanced
if θ is in an interval around 1, and we say that the exclusion technology is unbalanced
if θ converges either to 0 (favoring free riding) or ∞ (favoring enforcement).
Assuming ciS = 1, the solution of the individual maximization problem at stage 2
gives rise to the following Marshallian demand functions:19
c
j
iD
(
ej ,p
j
i , θ
) = max
[
0,
√
ej θ/p
j
i − pji
]
, (C.2)
a
j
i
(
ej ,p
j
i , θ
) = max
[
0,
√
ej θp
j
i − θej
]
. (C.3)
A short inspection reveals that aji (ej ,p
j
i , θ) ≥ 0 ⇔ ej ≤ pji /θ and cjiD(ej ,pji , θ) ≥
0 ⇔ ej ≥ (pji )3/θ , which implies that there are four different regimes:
• cjiD(ej ,pji , θ) > 0, aji (ej ,pji , θ) > 0: the individual invests in appropriation but at
the same time buys part of the good. This situation is likely to occur if appropriation
is relatively easy (θ is small) and the price of the good is low.
• cjiD(ej ,pji , θ) > 0, aji (ej ,pji , θ) = 0: The individual exclusively buys the good.
This situation is likely to occur if appropriation is relatively difficult (θ is large)
and the price of the good is low.
18One has to distinguish between the production costs of a given quantity of the spillover good that may be
positive or not, and the costs of an additional user that are necessarily equal to zero if the good in non-rival
in consumption.
19The calculations of this model have been carried out using the software package Mathematica 8.0. The
source code can be received from the authors upon request.
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• cjiD(ej ,pji , θ) = 0, aji (ej ,pji , θ) > 0: the individual invests in appropriation and
completely free rides. This situation is likely to occur if appropriation is relatively
easy (θ is small) and the price of the good is high.
• cjiD(ej ,pji , θ) = 0, aji (ej ,pji , θ) = 0: the individual completely free rides without
investing in appropriation. This situation can occur if (i) exclusion is not possible
(ej = 0 because θ = 0) or because the individual is deterred from appropriation
and the price is so high that it is not willing to buy the good either.
Note that scenarios 3 and 4 can never be rational from the point of view of the
other region as long as θ > 0 (the good is not purely public, exclusion is possible in
principle). The only reason to invest in exclusion is to raise revenue from user fees,
which implies that cjiD(ej ,p
j
i , θ) has to be positive. This can always be accomplished
by lowering pji . We can therefore restrict attention to scenarios 1 and 2. In scenario 1,
free-riding and user-fee payment take place at the same time, whereas free riding is
deterred in scenario 2.
Given the above analysis, the indirect-utility function is given by
v
j
i
(
ej ,p
j
i , θ
)
=
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
2 + (p
j
i )
2
2 − (pij )2 − 2
√
ejp
j
i θ +
√
eip
i
j θ + ej θ − ei, cjiD > 0, aji > 0,
2 + (p
j
i )
2
2 − (pij )2 − pji + pij θ−1θ cjiD > 0, aji = 0.
(C.4)
In order to determine the optimal {ei,pji }-pairs we start with the analysis of deter-
rence. In this case, it is straightforward to derive from (C.4) that the optimal user fee
from the point of view of region i is independent of the policies of region j and given
by pji = (1 − 1/θ)/2, and the associated demand is cjiD(θ) = (1 + 1/θ)/2. The price
is (weakly) positive and the demand does not exceed supply if θ > 1. This informa-
tion can be used to calculate indirect-utility functions in case of deterrence (D):
w
j
iD
(
θ,p
j
i , ej
) = 1.75 + (p
j
i )
2
2
+ 1
4θ2
− 2
√
ejp
j
i θ +
θ − 1
2θ
+ ej θ. (C.5)
In case of an interior solution with coexisting free-riding and user-fee payment, it
follows from (C.4) that the optimal policies are again independent and given by ei =
θ2/32 and pji = θ/8. The associated demand for the spillover good and appropriative
investments are given by
c
j
iD(θ) =
3θ
8
, a
j
i (θ) =
θ3
32
. (C.6)
This implies that a fraction 1 − θ/2 of the non-rival good is appropriated. Total con-
sumption of the spillover good is then 1 − θ/8 < 1, which implies that total demand
never exceeds supply. As before, this information can be used to calculate indirect-
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Fig. 1 Investments in exclusion and free riding (left panel) and consumption of the other region’s spillover
good (right panel) as functions of θ
utility functions in case of free riding (F ):
w
j
iF
(
θ,p
j
i , ej
) = 2 + (p
j
i )
2
2
+ ej θ − 2
√
ejp
j
i θ +
θ2
64
. (C.7)
Comparing (C.7) and (C.5) reveals that it is optimal to allow for free riding if θ < 2
and to deter free riding if θ > 2. The following figures summarize the results of the
model.
The left panel of Fig. 1 displays investments in exclusion (ei ) (dotted, increasing
line) and free riding (ai ) (dashed, inversely u-shaped line) as well as aggregate invest-
ments (ei + ai ) (solid line). For θ < 2, appropriation and defense coexist, whereas
aggregate investments are equal to investments in exclusion for θ > 2 (deterrence
equilibrium).
The right panel of Fig. 1 displays free-riding consumption (πji ciS ) (dotted, de-
creasing line), consumption with payment of user fees (cjiD) (dashed, increasing line
up to θ = 2), and aggregate consumption (πji ciS + cjiD) (solid, decreasing line). For
θ < 2 there is free riding on part of the spillover good, whereas no free riding occurs if
θ > 2. For θ → 0 exclusion is almost impossible, which implies that the total resource
costs of exclusion and free riding are approximately zero: given that exclusion is vir-
tually impossible, the individuals can free ride for (almost) free. As a consequence,
total consumption is almost exclusively composed of free-riding consumption, and
the socially efficient amount of the spillover good is consumed.
If θ gets larger (but stays smaller than 2), exclusion becomes increasingly easier,
which implies that each region starts investing in exclusion, which is first retaliated
by an increase in free-rider investments. As a consequence, the total resource costs
of exclusion go up. If θ = 1 neither exclusion nor appropriation has a relative ad-
vantage, which implies that both investments are identical. For larger values of θ ,
appropriation becomes more and more difficult, implying that the increase in exclu-
sion investments eventually force free riding investments to go down until at θ = 2
free riding is completely eliminated. Note that from the point of view of total resource
costs that are necessary to eliminate free riding, the economy pays a high price: the
sum of exclusion and free riding investments are maximized at θ = 2. For larger val-
ues of θ , the total resource costs of exclusion go down again because it is getting
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Fig. 2 User fees (left panel) and regional welfare (right panel) as a function of θ
increasingly easier to prevent free riding. In the limit for θ → ∞, even the tiniest
investment in exclusion completely prevents free riding.
With respect to the composition of consumption of the spillover good it follows
from the right panel of Fig. 2 that for θ < 2 free riding is increasingly replaced by
user-fee financed consumption until for θ ≥ 2 user fees are paid for 100 % of con-
sumption. A second observation is that total consumption falls monotonically in θ ,
which implies that the inefficiency due to the non-utilization of the non-rival goods is
increasing in θ . The left panel of Fig. 2 shows that this is a consequence of the steady
increase in user fees that comes along with the easier prevention of free riding. In-
terestingly, user fees are increasing in θ even if free riding is completely deterred
(θ > 2). The reason follows from the logic of marginal conditions: investments in
the enforcement of user fees are set as to make the potential free rider just indiffer-
ent between paying user fees and investing in free riding. As a consequence, higher
user fees increase the temptation to start free riding. This temptation is falling in θ ,
implying that higher user fees can be sustained.
User fees have the potential to help internalizing the spillovers of regionally pro-
vided non-rival goods, but regions use them primarily as a source to raise revenues.
This view is further confirmed if one has a look at the associated welfare levels. In
our example the former motive is completely absent. The right panel of Fig. 2 shows
the regional (indirect) utility levels in the Nash equilibrium. Two properties spring to
mind:
1. Comparing the extreme cases limθ→0 wjiF (θ) = 1 and limθ→∞ wjiD(θ) = 0.875
reveals that the use of the price mechanism has welfare costs even if free riding
can be prevented for (almost) free. This finding is of course a consequence of
the property that regions voluntarily provide the efficient quantity of the spillover
good. If this would not be the case, free riding would induce additional welfare
costs because of the (partial) non-internalization of the interregional spillovers.
In this case, user fees (partly) internalize these spillovers and help to bring the
economy closer to efficiency. However, even in this case the general tradeoff high-
lighted by our result remains: the decentralized setting of user fees cannot be ex-
pected to be efficient because of the dominant interest in maximizing revenues
from non-resident use.
2. The u-shape of the graph results from the fact that the resource costs of prevent-
ing free riding are large if the exclusion technology is relatively balanced. This
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finding reveals a general property of economic conflicts where individual success
depends on relative instead of absolute performance. Given that the prevention of
free riding with is a special type of property-rights enforcement has the character
of a conflict our results do not hinge on the specific functional forms employed
but reveal a general pattern.20 Improvements in the technology of enforcement
may worsen overall efficiency. This effect occurs if (i) enforcement is relatively
difficult and (ii) improvements are sufficiently limited.
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